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Abstract 
A database consists of an object space that is information about objects in (some part of) the 
real world. Every object existing in the real world has properties, including an identity that 
uniquely distinguishes it from other objects. In a belief database multiple subjects are 
hypothesized. Subjects have varying beliefs about existence, identities, and other properties of 
objects. A multilevel security database is a belief database where the subjects form a hierarchy. 
The upper users can see the object space of lower users but the lower users cannot. In fact lower 
users may not even be aware of upper users. This paper presents a skeleton based model for 
storage and query of a multilevel security database. This model follows the parametric approach 
proposed by Gadia. As in all works in the parametric approach, the central focus of this 
framework is to support most natural query of data. 
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1. Introduction 
A database stores reality that is an object space consisting of information about objects in 
(some part of) the real world. Every object has properties, including an identity that uniquely 
distinguishes it from other objects. We assume that there is only one reality. An ordinary database 
can be used to store this single reality. However, the reality may not always be known. This is true 
in a belief database where multiple subjects are hypothesized, each having its own view of object 
space describing reality. If subjects were only interested in storage and query of their own 
individual beliefs, isolated ordinary databases will serve their purpose. We assume a more 
interesting situation that subjects are interested in query of multiple beliefs. In that case, the 
ordinary database paradigm is not adequate. 
An interesting example of beliefs arises in the field of meteorology where scientists build 
numeric simulation models to predict climate. There, every simulation model (or scientist having 
a favorite model) is a subject and its prediction can be seen as its belief. lust as a temperature 
value changes from one spatial point to another, one instant to another, it also changes from one 
simulation model to another. Therefore, just as information can have time and space dimensions, 
it can also have a belief dimension. Points in belief space are nothing but subjects. As in any 
scientific discipline, the subjects (scientists) are not only aware of their own object spaces but also 
aware of object spaces belonging to other scientists. Scientific communities learn from each other 
for the advancement of science through mutual collaboration. 
Multilevel Security (MLS) database is another example of a belief database. In MLS subjects 
are users who share and query information in a database. These subjects form a hierarchy induced 
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by a partial order. Upper subjects can see information belonging to the lower ones. On the other 
hand lower subjects cannot see information belonging to upper subjects. In fact the subjects may 
not even be aware of subjects above them. Following our assumptions, the upper subjects are 
interested in query of beliefs belonging to them as well as subjects below them. Every subject has 
its own object space. Thus subjects may differ in their beliefs about which objects exist in the real 
world. Obviously, in a multilevel security environment such differences are only visible to upper 
subjects. Even when an upper subject concurs with a lower subject on existence of an object in the 
real world, they may differ in their beliefs about the identity and other properties of the object. 
Again concurrence and lack of it on identity and other properties are also known to upper subjects 
Example 1. Consider a hierarchy consisting of two subjects a and X where a is above X. The 
Figure 1.1 below shows an example of their belief worlds. The objects are shown as nodes. Here 
objects are people in the real world and their names serve as their unique identity. The subject a 
believes that there are four objects in the real world: Shyam, lim, Ying, and lack, whereas subject 
X believes there are three objects in the real world: lun, lack, and lackson. Note that because of 
the uniqueness of identity, a name cannot repeat at the same level. However, it can repeat across 
different levels. For example, lack appears in object spaces of a as well as X. Note that subject a 
sees its objects as well as objects belonging to X. However, X only sees three objects in its object 
Shyam Jim Ying Jack 
Jackso A : 
Figure 1.1. Upper and lower users and their object spaces 
3 
space and not even aware of the subject a, let alone a's object space. 
It is natural to assume that the upper subject a is more resourceful. It may learn that its object 
Shyam is known as lun to X and they are not two different objects in the real world. Similarly, lim 
is known as lackson. The edges represent a's concurrence with X. Note that the concurrence is 
limited to existence of objects. Such concurrence applies only to identity and it does not extend to 
other properties of objects. 
Assuming that Figure 1.1 contains the best knowledge that a has, the following can be inferred 
by a: The objects Ying and lack in its object space exist but they are unknown to X. Also, the 
object known as lack to X does not exist in the real world. 
How would we represent such object space in a database? For example, the object Shyam 
belonging to a that is known as lun to X can be represented by the function {(a, Shyam), (X, 
lun)}. Other objects are represented as {(a, lim), (X, lackson)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, lack)}, and {(X, 
lack)}. In a relational database we would represent these values under the Name column. As there 
are 5 objects in the belief world there would also be 5 tuples in the database. There is no loss of 
information as Figure 1.1 can be restored from the state of such database. Thus functions are 
appropriate abstraction for information in MLS. All 5 objects are visible to a. The information 
visible to X is a subset of this information (not a literal subset). There is no need to duplicate this 
information; one can simply obtain what is visible to X by a functional restriction to X. For 
example, restriction of above objects to the domain {X} will give {(X, lun)}, {(X, lack)}, and {(X, 
lackson)}, precisely the objects in X's object space. 
As far as representation of information is concerned, the ideas presented above can be 
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formalized to obtain a model for multilevel security. However, a difficulty arises when designing 
a query language. Query languages in databases are rooted in relational algebras. In other words 
to obtain a query language one must define relational operators first. These operators must obey 
good identities in order for the query language to be user-friendly. Relational algebra allows users 
to express their queries in different ways taking identities that equate them for granted. This 
principle is at the very core of databases. This is where one runs into problems in a naive 
approach to multilevel security. 
Example 2. Consider the following relation 
r = {{(a, Shyam), (X, lun)}, {(a, lim), (X, Jackson)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, Jack)}, {(X, Jack)}}. 
We think of a selection operator aL1(r) to be restriction of r to domain |i. Here are some 
computations: 
o{a}(r) = {{(a, Shyam)}, {(a, Jim)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, Jack)}} 
o{y(r) = {{(X, Jun)}, {(X, Jack)}, {(X, Jackson)}} 
o{a}u{X}(r) = a{a,x}(r) ={{(a, Shyam), (X, Jun)}, {(a, Jim), (X, Jackson)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, Jack)}, 
{(X, Jack)}} = r 
c{a}(r) u G;/,:(r) = {{(a, Shyam)}, {(a, Jim)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, Jack)}, {(X, Jun)}, {(X, Jack)}, 
(X,Jackson)}} 
One would expect the identity c {a} lj;/,;(r) = c{a}(r) ua;/-;(r) to hold naturally. However, this 
identity fails. Then how does a user know which side of the identity, if any, is correct? 
[1] was Gadia's first paper that gave a model and a query language for multilevel security. It 
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also showed how to solve the problem with algebraic identities discussed above. The solution 
required the concept of a value to be redefined in a way that it could not be destroyed by algebraic 
operators. 
Prior to the above paper an assumption was made universally in MLS database literature that 
the identity of an object remains invariant among all subjects. Thus for example, the object known 
as Ying to a can only be known as Ying to X. This assumption undermines the very concept of 
MLS. How would the subjects at different levels arrange identities of objects to coincide without 
mutual collaboration? In order to circumvent this question, a trusted agent was hypothesized who 
would make identities of objects available to every subject. The model [1] did not need the 
concept of trusted agent. The concept of trusted agent is contrary to the whole idea behind MLS. 
Gadia's second paper in MLS [4] was basically an exposition to the parametric approach to 
model the concept of dimension in data. It showed when identity of an object is required to 
remain the same at all levels, why there is hardly any difference between a temporal database 
model and a model for MLS. In the former the points in the parametric space are instants of time 
and in the latter they are subjects. The query languages for the two databases in the parametric 
approach have the same grammatical structure. The difference between them is rather small in 
that the linear structure on time and a partial order on subjects simply give rise to different atomic 
constructs. The paper agrees that the generic ParaSQL obtained in this way is more natural for 
users in general, as [10] in particular, than all models in MLS that existed at the time. 
As stated above, [1] was the first paper that allowed subjects the independence to have varying 
identities to objects. Subsequently, some papers have been published, such as [8] , that also allow 
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identity of an object to vary. But these models are difficult for users when compared to [1]. The 
parametric approach is completely user-centric in breadth as well as depth. The philosophy of the 
parametric approach is that a user should be able to take for granted constructs that are natural in a 
certain context. This forces the complexity of modeling to be absorbed by the system rather than 
passing it on to the user. 
In this paper we take our model of MLS one step further. The single focus of our work is to 
continue to produce a query framework that is most natural for users. This has to be done without 
compromising the integrity of information as alluded in Example 2. In addition, we feel that our 
framework will support efficient query processing. The queries that we can express naturally, will 
be very difficult to express in other models. Once the linguistics constructs in our query language 
are understood they can in fact augment natural languages to help MLS queries to be expressed 
more easily. The following example gives a glimpse of the issues we are trying to address in the 
new model of multilevel security. 
Example 3. Consider a three subject hierarchy consisting of subjects y, a, and 1. where y is the 
highest subject, 1 is the lowest and a is between the two. Object spaces of these subjects are 
shown in Figure 1.2. 
Y : Hari Jack Lan 
A : 
a : Shyam 
Jackson 
x 
Jack 
Figure 1.2. An example of object spaces from different users' views 
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We draw attention to the object Jack belonging to subject y from its own point of view. 
According to y, this object is known as Jack to ! and as Jim to a. However from a's point of view 
the object is known as Jackson to This entire observation could be an answer to the query that 
asks for all cascading identities of the object Jack belonging to subject y. In parametric model we 
regard this query as important and make it as easy for a user to express as possible. The problem 
is that this information is no longer a simple function because at X we have Jack as well as 
Jackson giving rise to the pairs Jack) and Jackson) that cannot belong to the same function. 
This problem can be solved by partitioning the above hierarchy into two levels at a time, and that 
is precisely what was done in [1], Gadia's first work in MLS. But the problem with that is from a 
user's point of view the query will require complex join operations. Furthermore, what is a join in 
this three level hierarchy will become multi-way join when the subject hierarchy is deeper. Thus 
the grammatical structure of the query would depend upon the subject hierarchy. This can be 
jarring to a user. For example, a query that worked in past may not work any longer if a subject is 
added at a lower level. Furthermore, it turns out that queries such as this can be complex even in a 
natural language, although one has a better hope of expressing it independently of object 
hierarchy. The query language we present will have phrases that could be seen to augment the 
natural language itself. An extended natural language, obtained in this way, would be much better 
equipped to pause useful queries in multilevel security. 
We also observe that in our examples considered so far we only have used subject hierarchies 
that were linear, where every subject is either below or above another subject. In [1] we 
considered the subjects to be partially ordered. Thus subjects could form a lattice shown in Figure 
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1.3. A lattice is not necessary, however. For example if either y or X is not present we do not have 
a lattice but the remaining subjects are still partially ordered. We also note that if y as well as "/. 
were not present, the subject space would reduce to two discrete levels a and |3 having no 
relationship with each other. Although our model would handle it, in such a case one would obtain 
a disjoint union of two ordinary databases. That is not an interesting scenario. In other words 
multilevel security is interesting only when there is a hierarchy. Nonlinear hierarchies have been 
alluded to in some early papers in multilevel security; however [1] seems to have given the first 
model and a query language where a non linear hierarchy was allowed. 
Figure 1.3. Example of partial order of user levels in MultiLevel Security Databases 
The term parametric data applies to all data where the values are tied down to points in some 
space that is simply termed the parametric space. Examples of parametric spaces are set of 
instants in temporal data, spatial points in spatial data, and subjects in belief data of which 
multilevel security is a special case. Thus all works in multilevel security databases, including [9], 
as well as those in temporal and spatial databases are works in parametric databases. 
A parametric space may be multidimensional. When the parametric space is restricted to a 
single point, a value becomes fixed. If this parametric point is ignored, the parametric database 
reduces to an ordinary (classical) database. In other words, a parametric database restricted to a 
a 
À 
1.1 Parametric data and parametric approach 
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single point in the parametric space is isomorphic to an ordinary classical database. Therefore, a 
classical database is a legitimate, albeit a simple and degenerate, case of parametric database. An 
ordinary database can be considered a parametric database where the underlying set of 
dimensions is empty. All concepts arising in ordinary classical databases (must and do) embed in 
parametric databases; this is not a matter of choice. 
The term parametric approach is used when the association of a value to points in the 
underlying parametric space is explicitly recognized and leveraged to study parametric databases. 
This brings many aspects of parametric data to surface and leads to a clearer understanding of 
parametric data. For example, consider the issue of nulls in databases. Often, in works in classical 
databases one assumes that there are no nulls in order to develop a core model and relational 
algebra, which in turn lead to user oriented query languages such as SQL. It is well known that 
the presence of nulls significantly complicate a query language. Parametric approach does not 
profess that one should not deal with nulls. However, it is important to be aware of nulls when 
they are present. 
What is the counterpart of non-nulls in parametric data? A tuple in a parametric approach is 
said to be homogeneous if all attribute values in the tuple have the same parametric domain. In 
absence of homogeneity, the database is bound to have nulls when restricted to single point. The 
homogeneity assumption allows us to obtain a core model, algebra, and SQL-style query language 
for parametric data much in the same way that the same exercise is carried on in classical model 
without nulls prior to taking nulls into consideration. 
Parametric approach also offers advantages. For example, any generic concept developed for 
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one type of dimension applies readily to other dimensions. As discussed above, [4] argues that a 
framework for temporal databases applies readily to multilevel security when all users are 
required to agree on key-values of an object. Another advantage of the parametric approach is that 
it makes a clear distinction between a weak concept and a strong concept. This classification 
stems from the two notions of equality among relations: weak equality and strong equality. 
("Strong" is used for emphasis and to contrast it from "weak".) Weak equality only requires two 
relations to have same information at every point in the parametric space. It ignores how 
information at different points is combined together. (Strong) equality requires the two relations to 
be identical. All concepts in parametric databases can be classified as weak or strong. For 
example the identity rus = sur is a weak identity and not a strong identity simply because r(p) 
us(p) = s(p)ur(p) holds at every point p in the parametric space. An implication of this is that this 
identity is not new in parametric databases. Weak concepts are simply counterpart of classical 
concepts, whereas strong concepts are truly new. Parametric approach also does not subscribe to 
any fixed paradigm, e.g. relational, object-oriented, or XML. However, it imposes a very strict 
discipline on how the concept of dimension is added. 
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2. Overview of the skeleton-MLS model 
2.1 Subjects and users 
In multilevel security databases, multiple users with a partial order (<) among them form a 
security hierarchy. We call these users subjects [6], For simplicity, we assume that in each user 
level, we only use one user. In other words, we don't distinguish users at the same level. In 
previous section, a need was alluded to for modeling and query of all cascading beliefs relative to 
a subject. Informally, a skeleton assembles such cascading beliefs. Skeletons are formalized as 
values in the parametric model. Then one goes on to derive tuples and relations, paving a 
foundation to algebraic operators, which would in turn lead to SQL-style query language. 
We will use "user", "user level" and "subject" interchangeably. We denote the set of all users as 
U. For two users ul and u2, if ul < u2 and ul #u2, then ul is said to be below u2 or u2 is above 
ul. Recall in Figure 1.3, we have an example with a partial order a <y, (3 <y, X < a, X < (3, and 1 < 
y which is derived from transitivity. Bell Lapadula model tells us that an upper level user has read 
access to lower level user and that a lower level user has write access to upper level user in 
MultiLevel Security Database [6]. 
2.2 Objects, concurrence and belief worlds 
We assume there is only one reality of data in the real world. The real world consists of a set of 
objects, called the object space. However, different users have varying views of object space. 
Each object, according to a user's view, has a set of properties, which are also known as attributes. 
We use identity of each object as the key attribute. Thus, objects are uniquely identified by the 
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key attribute. As an example in Figure 1.2, assuming the key attribute is name, in user y's object 
space, there are exactly three objects: Jack, Hari and Lan. User a's object space is {Shyam, Jim, 
Ying, Jack}. And user X's object space is {Jun, Jack, Jackson}. As an extension of example in 
Figure 1.2, Figure 2.2.1 lists object spaces with attribute values for each user in Figure 1.3. 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
Y Jack Y 100K Y Toys 
Lan 65K Shoes 
Hari 5 OK Toys 
a Jack a 40K a Shoes 
Shyam 5 OK Toys 
Jim 60K Toys 
Ying 65K Clothes 
13 Jose 13 40K 13 Toys 
Olga 5 OK PCs 
Jackson 60K Clothes 
I Jack I 60K I Clothes 
Jun 70K PCs 
Jackson 80K Toys 
Figure 2.2.1. Object spaces 
Recall that an upper subject has read access to lower subject and that a lower subject has write 
access to upper subject in Multilevel Security Databases. This property is also represented in the 
Figure 1.2. The edges show the concurrences to objects from an upper user to a lower user. For 
example, the edge from (y, Jack) to (a, Jim) implies one of y's concurrences with a, i.e., the object 
known as Jim to a is known as Jack to y; the edge from (y, Jack) to (1, Jack) tells us Jack at "/. is 
known as Jack to y, which is another concurrence of y; the edge from (a, Jim) to (1, Jackson) is a 
concurrence of a, showing that in a's point of view, Jackson at X is the same object as Jim at a. 
Due to the existence of edges from (y, Jack) to (a, Jim) and from (a, Jim) to (1, Jackson), we 
cannot have another edge from (y, Jack) to (a, Ying) or from (a, Jack) to Jackson), which are 
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shown by using dashed lines in Figure 1.2. The existence of such dashed lines is meaningless 
because it implies the confliction of the upper user's belief. 
For those objects that don't have any edge connected from an upper level, they are not believed 
to exist in the real world by that specific upper level user. For example, in Figure 1.2, Jack at a 
level is believed to be a fake object by y; a doesn't think Jack at X exists in real world. 
A subject has interest in its own object space, object space belonging to lower users as well as 
cascading concurrences about identities of objects. Collectively such object spaces and 
concurrences are called the belief world of a subject. For example, in Figure 1.1, the belief world 
of a could be represented as {{(a, Shyam), (X, Jun)}, {(a, Jim), (X, Jackson)}, {(a, Ying)}, {(a, 
Jack)}, {(X, Jack)}}. 
2.3 Path expressions 
A parametric space of points is hypothesized in the parametric approach to databases. Subjects 
can be treated as points in parametric space in multilevel security databases. A value is a function 
from a subset of the parametric space. And this subset is the domain of the function. 
We want to preserve user's cascading view of an object into one tuple so that we can design an 
efficient query language for users to ask questions about multiple beliefs. If we save user's 
cascading view of an object, i.e., objects at different levels but are believed directly or indirectly 
as one object by users, into one tuple instead of breaking them each into one tuple, join will be 
largely reduced. As an example of Figure 2.3.1, (a) is a graph representation of y's cascading view 
of Jack; (b) is a tabular representation by using subjects as parametric points. 
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Jack 
Jim 
Jose 
Jackson 
(a) A belief of y 
NAME 
y, Jack 
a, Jim 
|3, Jose 
X, Jack 
X, Jackson 
NAME 
y, Jack 
y.a, Jim 
y.|3, Jose 
y.a A, Jackson 
y.|3.X, Jack 
y.X, Jack 
(b) Object (a) without path expression (c) Object (a) with path expression closed 
under prefixes 
Figure 2.3.1. Objects and path expressions 
We can see that using only subjects as points, as in Figure 2.3.1 (b), to represent the subject's 
cascading view of an object cannot form a function. There are two values at X level (1, Jack) and 
(1, Jackson). We cannot put them into one value. Further more, we will lose all concurrences 
between different user levels. We are not able to find out whether (1, Jackson) is connected with 
(a, Jim) or (|3, Jose). When we have a graph representation, we can get this tabular representation. 
However, with this tabular representation, we cannot restore the graph. Besides these, as we 
mentioned in Example 2, algebraic identities will break down by using subjects themselves as 
parametric points. 
To solve the above problems, we use path expressions as parametric points. A path expression 
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is a container that is used to represent a higher user's concurrence with a lower user. If ui is above 
u2, then ui.u2 is a path expression that is used to represent u/s concurrence with u2. Only Ui knows 
this concurrence, u2 doesn't know anything about it since u2 isn't even aware of the existence of 
Ui because of the partial order. 
We can also recursively define path expression. The path expression U1.U2.U3 un means each 
user is in concurrence with the user right after him, and whatever next user believes, he doesn't 
care. For example, U1.U2.U3 means Ui is in concurrence with u2 and whoever u2 is in concurrence 
wi th ,  u i  doesn ' t  ca re .  Th is  he lps  us  recognize  the  d i f fe rence  be tween  yX and  y .aX.  Whereas  yX 
represents concurrence of y with 1, y.aX does not. The latter represents y's concurrence with X via 
a, i.e., y concurs what a believes and a concurs what X believes. 
Figure 2.3.1 (c) is a tabular representation of y's cascading view of Jack by using path 
expressions as parametric points. Every path expression in the tuple appears no more than once 
and is closed under prefixes. The situation that one atomic value is mapped from two path 
expressions might happen, but no two values are mapped from one path expression. With this 
representation, we keep all the cascading beliefs, from different levels related to an object, in one 
tuple. 
With the property of path expressions closed under prefixes in a tuple, concurrences are easily 
inferred. As an example in Figure 2.3.1 (c), we are able to figure out that Jim known to a is 
known as Jackson to 1. Each user's belief is persistent and traceable when incorporating path 
expression and the attribute value. We don't save the information about the edges appeared in 
Figure 2.3.1 (a), which represent concurrences, since all the concurrence information can be 
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easily implied from path expressions within a tuple. Edges are actually virtual. We only keep such 
tree-like structure (with edges) appearing in the paper for good visualization and easy 
understanding. 
Let's give a scenario with concurrences for the objects in Figure 2.2.1: 
v. Hari Jack Lan 
Shyam 
Jun 
Jim JYing Jack 
Jos< Jackson 
Jacl Jackson 
(a) y's belief world 
Shyam Jim Ying Jack 
Jack 
Jun Jackso 
(b) a's belief world 
Figure 2.3.2. Example of Emp relation: scenario with concurrences 
Figure 2.3.2 (a) shows y's belief world. Figure 2.3.2 (b) is a's belief world, which could be 
generated from Figure 2.3.2 (a). 
With the partial order of user levels we mentioned in Figure 1.3, the set of all possibilities of 
valid path expressions representing concurrences is {y, a, |3,1, y.a, y.|3, J.L. a./., fi./., y.a./.. y.|3.X}. 
We call this set the set C, meaning the set of concurrence. Each element in set C is a parametric 
element. 
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From now on, we have a new definition of the parametric space in our model. Every element in 
set C is a point in the parametric space. For each point in C which has only one user level, it 
represents the user's belief to an object at its own object space; for elements which have more 
than one user levels, the last user level tells us in which level this object belongs to, and the prefix 
forms a path of the belief. 
Example 4. Suppose we want to represent Jackson at 1 level from y's point of view in Figure 
2.3.2, by using path expression as domain of function to attribute NAME, we will have (y.a./.. 
Jackson). With this representation, we can easily infer: 
(1) Jackson is an object belonging to user X. 
(2) This object is in user y's belief world as well as a's belief world. However, this doesn't 
imply the object from path expression aX is only in a's belief world. It's also in y's belief 
world, yet, not in y's object space. 
(3) Jackson is known as some object, let's say a, at a level. Furthermore, a at a level is known 
to be some object, let's say b, in y's object space. 
2.4 Attribute values 
A C-assignment to an attribute A of an object is a function q from a parametric element into 
dom(A), the domain of A. For example, according to Figure 2.3.2 (a), {(y, Hari), (y, Jack), (y, 
Lan)} is a y-assignment to the attribute NAME; {(aX, Jun), (a./.. Jackson)} is a a./.-assignment to 
the attribute NAME. 
The domain of a security value E, is denoted as [[£,]]. For example, [[{(y, Jack), (y.a, Jim), (y.a./.. 
Jackson)}]] = {y , y.a , y.a./.}. We assume that the attribute values within the same tuple have the 
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same domain. This assumption, termed homogeneity assumption in the parametric model, is the 
counterpart of classical database without nulls. 
2.5 Mask: incorporating path expression in achieving persistence 
of algebraic identities 
In MLS, the most interesting queries are queries about different beliefs. As an example, user y 
might ask "give me all the objects in my belief world which are known as Jack (directly or 
indirectly) in my object space". Our goal is to provide a query language for users to make such 
queries as easy as possible. 
Jack 
Jackso 
(a) A value 
Jacksor 
(b) select {(P, Jose), 
(X, Jackson)} 
NAME 
y.a , Jim 
y.p, Jose 
y.a./-, Jackson 
(c) Tabular representation 
Figure 2.5.1. Masking helps result maintain one value 
Every user should have full knowledge of all the concurrences and objects in its belief world. 
Whenever a query happens, the result might chop cascading beliefs of an object into several 
pieces. Some pieces belong to the user's belief world; however, they are not originally queried. 
For example, Figure 2.5.1 (a) is y's cascading view of object Jack. It is one value in our model. 
What would it be if we just select two objects, Jose at P and Jackson at out of this value? We 
still want to keep these two objects in one value so that the result is consistent with the original 
value. To fulfill this purpose, we have to keep Jack at y and Jim at a as well in the query result. To 
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differentiate the wanted query result and these auxiliary information, we mask Jack at y and Jim at 
a so that the user knows it's not what he originally queried about. The user who did the query can 
see the masked part; however, he knows this part as an auxiliary in the query result. The mask is 
denoted by using a separator || after the domain, representing the point is masked. If the domain of 
an object is masked, the object itself is also masked. 
With mask, a path expression can be represented as p||, where p is a legal path expression, i.e., a 
legal parametric element. If a path expression is masked, the attribute value from this path 
expression is also masked. 
2.5.1 Path expressions with the property of closure under 
prefixes suffice u and n. 
Jackso 
(a) A value 
A 
Y • Jac 
Jacksoi Jacksoi 
(b)Sl (c)S2 (d) SluS2 
Figure 2.5.2. Path expressions with closure under prefixes suffice u and n 
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Figure 2.5.2 is an example of how to perform union of two selections. In order to make identity 
that selection of union equals to union of selections hold, in every selection, for each object we 
query about, we will keep all the objects from root along the belief path until this object, with 
objects that we didn't query about being masked. Note that the result in Figure 2.5.2(d) is same as 
Figure 2.5.1(b). 
By doing this, the path expressions in every value (no matter it is an original value in database 
or generated after some queries) are closed under prefixes. This property of path expressions in a 
value always gives us a path of beliefs from the root till any object in this value. 
Not only does the operator of union need this property, intersection also requires path 
expressions in a value closed under prefixes. 
2.5.2 Difference preserves the whole skeleton with masking. 
With the example showed in Figure 2.5.2, we know that path expressions with closure under 
prefixes suffice union and intersection. However, this property only fails the difference operator. 
Consider the example showed in Figure 2.5.2, how can we perform SI - S2? According to 
parametric approach, we will first consider dom(Sl) - dom(S2). When we take a look at each pair 
path expressions of the atomic values, we could get the combination of masked path expression, 
unmasked path expression as well as null. How could we define the operation of difference 
between any two of them? For example, path expressions of Jack at y in both SI and S2 are 
masked. Should the difference between these two path expressions be null? This is obviously 
wrong since we need to keep path expressions closed under the prefixes. This implies that we 
shouldn't have null atomic values after difference operation as long as some atomic value(s) is not 
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null within the same value. Therefore, the way how SI and S2 form is questioned. For SI, all the 
unneeded tailings were deleted, resulting nulls in atomic values. Same applies to S2. If we should 
keep every atomic value, those masked tailings would be kept. Then with this domain, we 
compute the function. This results in keeping the whole skeleton with some part being masked 
and others not. 
Jacl 
Jacksoi 
Jacl 
Josi 
Jacksi 
Jacl 
Josi 
Jacksi 
(a) SI (b)S2 (c)Sl-S2 
Figure 2.5.3 Difference preserves whole skeleton with masking 
Figure 2.5.3 gives us the same queries SI and S2, except that we keep the whole skeleton, with 
irrelevant objects masked and wanted objects unmasked. Now we know how to perform 
difference between these two values. A formal definition about algebraic operations of 
masked/unmasked path expressions is defined in 2.8. 
An important property of mask is that the path expression without a mask always dominates the 
same path expression with a mask. For example, {p||}u{p} = {p}. This property is used in the 
example given in Figure 2.5.3. More examples of algebraic operations will be given in section 
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2.6 Relationship between a user's view and the result of a query 
from this user 
We've talked about a user's view sometimes. A  user's view is the user's belief world, i.e., all 
that the user can see. It includes all the objects belonging to this user, all the objects of lower 
user(s), and all the cascading concurrences. 
The result of a query asked by this user is a subset of this user's view. In order to make the 
result persistent to the original view and the algebraic identities to hold, the whole skeleton will 
be kept in the result and mask will be applied if necessary. 
2.7 Dealing with masked path expressions 
Two path expressions pi and p2 are said to be same if pi=p2. For example, none of the path 
expressions y.a, y.L y.a|| is same as the other. 
Two path expressions pi and p2 are said to be similar, denoted as p,~p2. if either they are same 
or they differ only in their masks. For example, a.X~a.X||. 
If p is a path expression without mask, p|| denotes the similar path expression with mask. If p is 
a path expression with or without mask, [p] denotes a path expression similar to p, but without 
mask. If P is a set of path expressions, [P] is a set formed by similar path expressions without 
mask of all the path expressions in P. 
X y xvy xAy x-y —IX 
p p P P P l l  P l l  
p P l l  P  P l l  P  P l l  
P l l  p P  P l l  P l l  p 
P l l  P l l  P l l  P l l  P l l  p 
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Definition 1 : Suppose x and y are two similar path expressions, and p denotes a path expression 
without mask. The computation of union, intersection, difference and complementation of x and y 
is given below. Note that this table is isomorphic to truth table, where p behaves as TURE and p|| 
behaves as FALSE. 
Definition 2: Suppose C is the set of parametric space, Pi and P2 are two sets of path expressions 
with elements possibly masked. In the following, the computation of union, intersection, and 
difference of Pi and P2 is defined by using the literal union, intersection, and difference. In each 
equation, the symbols u, n, - on the right hand side of equal sign denote literal union, literal 
intersection and literal difference respectively. 
Pi union P2 = {x: [x]e [Pi] -[P2]} 
u {x: [x]e[P2] -[Pi]} 
u {xvy: XG Pi, and ye P2, and x~y} 
Pi intersection P2 = {xAy: XG P,. and ye P2, and x~y} 
Pi difference P2 = {x: [x]e [Pi] -[P2]} u {x-y: xePi, and ye P2, and x~y} 
Since in our model, we will never use u, n, - to denote literal union, intersection and 
difference later on, we will use "PiuP2" to denote "Pi union P2", "PinP2" to denote "Pi 
intersection P2", and "Pi-P2" to denote "Pi difference P2" from now on. 
Example 5. Suppose Pi={y, y.a, y l ,  y.al||}, P2={y||, y.a||, yl||, y.a.X}, then PiuP2 = {y, y.a, yl, 
y.al}, PinP2 = {y||, y.a||, yl||, y.al||}, P,-P2 = {y, y.a, yl, y.al\\}, P2-Pi = {y||, y.a||, yl||, 
y.a.X}. 
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2.8 Compatible atomic values, compatible values and equivalent 
terminal values 
With the concept of masked path expressions, we say two atomic values at point pi and p2 
respectively (i.e., two objects) are compatible if V1(p1)=V2(p2) and pi~p2. In another word, when 
two atomic values are compatible, they are same object with similar path expressions. 
Definition 3: Suppose two atomic values Vi(pO = (pi, a) and V2(p2) = (p2, a) are compatible, then 
the union, intersection, and difference of these two compatible atomic values are defined as 
following: 
Vi(pi) u V2(p2) = ( pi v p2, a) 
Vi(pi) n V2(p2) = ( pi A p2, a) 
Vi(pi) - V2(p2) = ( pi - p2, a) 
Example 6. Algebraic operations for compatible atomic values. 
(y, Jim) n (y||, Jim) = (y||, Jim) 
(y, Jim) u (y||, Jim) = (y, Jim) 
(y, Jim) — (y||, Jim) = (y, Jim) 
Two values Vi and V2 are said to be compatible if they are rooted in compatible atomic values. 
Figure 2.8.1 gives us three compatible values, (a), (b), (c) are tabular representations and (d), 
(e), (f) are corresponding graph representations by circling masked objects. 
Union, intersection and difference of two compatible values result in one value. Their roots 
help us achieve persistence of algebraic identities when performing union and/or intersection. 
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In section 2.5, we already mention that path expressions with the property of closure under 
prefixes only already suffice union and intersection. Readers might already notice that in Figure 
2.5.2, except the wanted objects and objects from root along the belief path are preserved, all the 
rest objects are deleted. However, the operator difference preserves the whole skeleton. 
y, Jack 
y.a, Jim 
y.|3, Jose 
yX, Jack 
y.p.X, Jack 
y.aX, Jackson 
y, Jack 
y.a, Jim 
y.|3||, Jose 
y.X||, Jack 
y.p.X||, Jack 
y.a.X||, Jackson 
y |  I ,  Jack 
y.a, Jim 
y.p, Jose 
y.X||, Jack 
y.p.X||, Jack 
y.a.X||, Jackson 
E 
Jackson Jackson Jacksœr 
(d)graph representation of (a) (e)graph representation of (b) (f)graph representation of (c) 
£ B 
Figure 2.8.1. Compatible values 
To deal with union, intersection and difference uniformly, during the computation, we always 
keep the whole skeleton with some objects masked when necessary. After we finish computation, 
we can prune the masked tails in a skeleton. 
Suppose Vi and V2 are two values, we say Vi and V2 have equivalent values, Vi = V2, if for any 
unmasked object in Vi, there is also a same unmasked object in V2, and all the objects from the 
roots along the path to these two unmasked objects in V] and V2 respectively are pairwise same. 
The word "same" implies the same objects with same path expressions. 
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Suppose we have an employee relation shown in Figure 2.3.2, and y wants to know what is in 
user a's belief about Jim in its own object space, Figure 2.8.2 answers the question by giving us a 
group of equivalent terminal values which are in graph representation. All the masked objects are 
circled. Each of these equivalent values can be retrieved as the result of this query. Among them, 
(a) has the most complete information of this value. It contains the whole skeleton. We call this 
value max(V). However, some information in max(V) is totally irrelevant, such as Jose in |3 level, 
since a and |3 are two independent users, (d) has the least but complete information that are 
necessary. We call it an equivalent terminal value of these equivalent values. 
JackJ i Jackson Jack« i Jackson 
(a)Vi (b)V: 
Jirr 
Jacksor 
•Jack1 
Jacksor 
(d)Vj 
Figure 2.8.2. Equivalent values 
Within an equivalent terminal value, all the path expressions satisfy the property of closure 
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under prefixes. It maintains a full path of beliefs for any unmasked objects, starting from the root 
object to this unmasked object. After any algebraic computation, the value we get is max(V). For 
simplicity, we will use equivalent terminal value instead to show the results of queries later on. 
2.9 Skeleton and tuple 
We already know that if we want to represent an object of the highest user's cascading view 
among several user levels, we use path expressions as points in domain with the property of 
closure under prefixes. Each object from one path expression is a belief of some user. All these 
objects as well as the concurrences among them form a rooted tree-like graph. In Figure 2.3.2 (a), 
we have seven such kind of rooted "trees" (each object without any concurrence by itself is a tree, 
and this kind of trees only has a root). We call each such kind of rooted tree a skeleton. 
Each skeleton represents a relationship between a set of objects in different levels from 
different users' view. These objects are either directly related to each other or indirectly related to 
each other. All the pairs of two objects in one skeleton are rooted in the same root, i.e., the roots 
of any pair of objects have compatible atomic values. For example, (y, Jack) and (y||, Jack) are 
same root, but (y, Jack) and ("/.. Jack) are different roots. 
In the context of parametric approach, each valid path expression is a point in parametric space. 
When mapping them to a skeleton, each path expression is also a point sitting in the last user level 
of this path expression and showing the path of belief. For example, (y.a.X, Jackson) in Figure 
2.5.1 gives us a parametric point y.a.X. The value of this point is Jackson and this point resides at 
/. level. Incorporating the property of closure under prefixes, we can easily figure out the path of 
belief. In Figure 2.5.1, {(y, Jack), (y.a, Jim), (y.(3, Jose), (y.a./.. Jackson)} gives us a hint that one 
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path of belief is from user y to user a, and then extend to user /.. Jack known to y is known as Jim 
to a; Jackson known to X is known as Jim to a. When we look at the object (y.a./.. Jackson), we 
can also trace the belief by tracing the prefixes of this path expression in the same tuple. 
Recall that we used edges between two parametric points (path expressions) to explain 
concurrences. Now we can easily figure out the concurrences in a tuple by using the property of 
closure under prefixes of path expressions in a tuple. We don't save those edges in our model. 
However, we keep them in skeleton graph for users to understand the idea easily. 
When a query is performed, we might only want an object from lower user level instead of the 
whole cascading view from an upper user. Thinking of a skeleton, if we just withdraw the needed 
point from the whole tree, we will lose all the concurrence information related to this object. Then 
the result of this query is not consistent and complete. 
When we say consistent, we mean the result of a query should be consistent with the original 
database and it should be within a certain user's view (depending on who is asking the query); 
when we say complete, we mean we should preserve the integrity of the data. We shouldn't lose 
any necessary information. 
Our solution, the skeleton-based MLS model, will keep the root as well as the path information 
in any query result. Since this information is valid for the query-asking user to know, it is legal to 
appear in the query result. However, to differentiate the wanted result and the auxiliary 
information, we mask all the objects which are not originally wanted in the result by using 
separator || after the path expression(s). In Figure 2.5.1, the root was masked. Each tuple in the 
result of such a query should have the full path from root till the object which was queried, 
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incorporating with mask if necessary. As a result, the domain of each tuple is closed under 
prefixes. 
So far, we only talk about the identities of objects, specifically, "Name" in this context. What 
about the other properties of an object? A tuple in a parametric approach is said to be 
homogeneous if all attribute values in the tuple have the same parametric domain. In absence of 
homogeneity, the database is bound to have nulls when restricted to single point. The 
homogeneity assumption allows us to obtain a core model, algebra, and SQL-style query language 
for parametric data much in the same way that the same exercise is carried on in classical model 
without nulls prior to taking nulls into consideration. 
Y : Jack 1001 < Toy s 
a : / 1 eirr 60 K Toys 
G : Jose 1 VoK Toys 
A : 
. -. | Jacl^on 
Jack! \ 60 K 
i 8 OK Clothe a Toys 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
(a) Attribute values 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
y,Jack y, 100K y , Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p , Toys 
y.X, Jack y.X,60K y.A, Clothes 
y.p.A,, Jack y.p.X,60K y.p.A, Clothes 
y.a.A, Jackson y.a.A, 8OK y.a.A, Toys 
(b) A tuple 
Figure 2.9.1 Skeleton and tuple 
Suppose each object has Name, which is the key attribute, Salary, and DName, which stands for 
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the department name of this object. How would we represent all the properties of an object under 
the skeleton model? Recall that it is the concurrence applied to identity which helps form the 
skeleton, and that such concurrence applies only to identity without extending to other properties 
of objects. With the assumption of homogeneity, same skeleton structure will apply to remaining 
attributes. As an example, Figure 2.9.1 (a) is the skeleton representation of name, salary and 
department name values, and Figure 2.9.1 (b) is the tabular representation of corresponding 
skeletons. This gives us a tuple. Note that identity as well as other properties can vary from 
subject to subject. 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
tl y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.aX, 80K y.aX, Toys 
h y, Hari y,50K y, Toys 
yX, Jun y.l, 70K yX, PCs 
h a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
aX, Jun aX, 7OK aX, PCs 
U a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
ts y, Lan y, 65K y, Shoes 
y.a, Ying y.a, 65K y.a, Clothes 
te P, Olga P, 50K P,PCs 
t7 P,Jackson P, 60K P, Clothes 
p.X, Jackson P.I, 80K P%, Toys 
Figure 2.9.2 Emp relation 
Every attribute in a tuple is a C-assignment. As a formal definition, a C-tuple, or simply a tuple 
is a concatenation of C-assignment whose security domains are the same, i.e. all the attribute 
values in the tuple have the same domain, and all the attribute values which have the same domain 
or path expression represent the properties of the same object. So the tuples in our model are 
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homogeneous [3], 
Figure 2.9.2 is a tabular representation of all the tuples in Employee relation, where t, is the ith 
tuple. Objects and attribute values come from Figure 2.2.1 and concurrences come from Figure 
2.3.2 (a). We can see that in ti, Jim at a level, Jose at (3 level and Jack at "/. level are known as Jack 
to y. Jack at X level is known as Jose to (3. Jackson at X level is known as Jim to a. 
There are four properties about a tuple: 
(1) Tuple and skeleton are in 1-1 correspondence. 
(2) In each tuple, there won't be two similar path expressions. This will imply a conflict of a 
user's belief. 
(3) In every tuple, the path expressions are closed under prefixes. 
(4) In every tuple, every object is rooted on the root of the corresponding skeleton. The path 
expression for a root contains only one user level. 
2.10 Dealing with masked path expressions between skeletons 
You may notice that in Example 5, there are no two similar but not same path expressions in P, 
only or P2 only (recall that Pi={y, y.a, y.X, y.a.X||}, P2={y||, y.a||, y.X||, y.a.X}). This is true for any 
tuple. In each tuple, a path expression is either masked or unmasked. There won't be two similar 
path expressions existing in one tuple. The operations of union, intersection, difference, and 
complementation that we defined in definition 2 are operations in tuple level. In another words, 
these operations are aiming at dealing with generated tuples from the same skeleton. If a set of 
path expressions has similar but not same path expressions, this set contains information of more 
than one skeleton. In such case, this set can be broken down into several subsets, each mapping to 
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one skeleton. By using definition 2, we can deal with each skeleton easily. Different skeletons in a 
relation will be regarded as disjoint sets. Union, intersection, and difference between two different 
skeletons will be same as literal union, intersection, difference and complementation. 
2.11 Compatible tuples 
In our skeleton-based MLS model, we always store only the whole information in database 
from the highest user's view. The information visible to any lower user is a subset of this 
information. There is no need to duplicate this information. Within each view (generated or 
original), the result of a query is nothing but this view with some objects masked. Whenever a 
query happens, according to who is asking the question, the first thing is to compute the user's 
belief world. The second thing is to generate the result from this space. 
We say two tuples are compatible if they have compatible key values. When two tuples are 
compatible, the union of them will result in one tuple. This is obvious when we think in terms of 
skeletons. These tuples are either from the original database, or generated from the database, they 
are the whole skeleton itself or part of the same skeleton. After the operation of union, they should 
maintain in one skeleton, in another word, one tuple. 
2.12 Belief consistency among tuples 
Recall in Figure 2.3.2 (a), the object Jackson at X level stays in two skeletons: one is a 
cascading view of Jack at y level; another is a cascading view of Jackson at (3 level. Since we 
represent each skeleton as a tuple, Jackson at X level will reside in two tuples. If the salary of 
Jackson is 70K in one tuple and 8OK in another, the problem of belief inconsistency will arise. 
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Suppose is a tuple belonging to a user ul5 x2 is a tuple belonging to a lower user u2, pi is a 
path expression in xi and p2 is a path expression in x2, such that for any p, and p2, if one of pi and 
p2 is the suffix of the other, and the key attribute in xi on path expression p, is same as key 
attribute in x2 on path expression p2, then the two tuples are said to be belief consistent if they 
agree on all attributes having the path expressions pi in xi and p2 in x2. 
Belief inconsistency might happen when one object is saved in more than one tuples in 
database. In our model, it only happens on objects sitting where different skeletons meet. 
Whenever there is an update operation, we need to take care of belief consistency. 
Note that the concept of belief consistency is different from the concept of compatible tuples. 
Belief inconsistency arises when one object has to be saved in different tuples in database, 
whereas, for all compatible tuples, they are generated in computation time from the same tuple 
which is saved in the database. There will not be any inconsistency in compatible tuples. If two 
tuples are incompatible, they must have been generated from two different tuples, i.e., they come 
from two different skeletons. 
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3. Extract algorithm: generating user's view 
Extract algorithm is used to compute a user's belief world. In database, we always maintain the 
data according to the highest user's view so that we could always keep a complete knowledge of 
data. Whenever a query happens, the first thing the system will do is to find out who is asking the 
question. According to the user's security level, the system extracts all the objects and 
concurrences the user could see and form the tuples based on the tuple properties. 
There are three steps of extract algorithm: 
(1) Throwing out the objects not belonging to the users above the current user level. This 
will leave us all the objects that the current user can see. Recall in a path expression, the 
last user level tells us where the object resides. Figure 3.1 (a) gives us the result of 
generating a's view from y's view in Figure 2.9.1 after the first step in both tabular 
representation and graph representation. Notice that we throw away the tuples t6 in Figure 
2.9.1 and some objects inside other tuples, such as tv 
(2) Cleaning prefixes of domain so that the current user has no information about levels not 
belonging to him. The domain of objects within a tuple should be closed under prefixes 
and every point in the domain is rooted in the root of skeleton. As we are cleaning the 
prefixes of domain, some path expressions are reduced into just one user level. This 
results in more than 2 roots in one tuple (recall that only root has a path expression with 
just one user level). If we meet with such kind of path expression, we will move the 
object(s) from this path expression, as well as all the object(s) with path expressions 
having this path expression as prefix, into a new tuple. This is easily understood when we 
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think about a skeleton. After the domain restriction to a lower user, some objects at 
different levels which used to be in one skeleton might be broken into different skeletons 
(e.g. when we have to chop the root out). As a result, these objects will be broken into 
different tuples. From the point where the skeleton splits, all the descendents of this 
object will go with this object and form a new skeleton. In Figure 3.1 (b), after cleaning 
the prefixes, we have 7 tuples. The last tuple t' is the one generated from previous ti. 
(3) Merging redundant objects. Objects which used to be meeting points of different 
skeletons and resided in different tuples now might still appear in several tuples, some of 
them becoming roots. We need to merge these objects together since they actually 
represent the same object. The rule of merging is always to merge an object being a root 
as well as all its descendants into the same object being a descendant of some other root. 
In Figure 3.1 (c), we merge (1, Jun) into t2 and (/.. Jackson) into ti. 
Recall Figure 2.3.2 (b) is a scenario for concurrences from user a's view. Compared with 
Figure 2.3.2 (b) and Figure 3.1 (c), they are consistent. 
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NAME SALARY DNAME 
tl y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.aX, 80K y.aX, Toys 
t] yX, Jun y.l, 70K yX, PCs 
t3 a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
aX, Jun aX, 70K aX, PCs 
t4 a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t5 y.a, Ying y.a, 65K y.a, Clothes 
ty p.X, Jackson P.I, 80K P%, Toys 
Jim Jack im 
Jack Jacksop 
(a) First step 
Figure 3.1. Three steps of generating a's view from y's view 
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NAME SALARY DNAME 
tl a, Jim a, 60K a, Toys 
a.X, Jackson a X ,  8OK a.X, Toys 
t2 X, Jun 1,70K l,PCs 
t3 a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
a X ,  Jun a X ,  7OK a X ,  PCs 
t4 a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t5 a, Ying a, 65K a, Clothes 
tl X,Jackson 80K X, Toys 
f X, Jack 1,60K X, Clothes 
Y : 
\ / \ 
. I I U » 
nig \ Jack/ 
L / \ • y 
N 
\ 'V 
\ <r ^ _ \ y 
\ / I I Jadk N \ y 
JurX è / f t* ^ JackMi » ,7 / 
(b) Second step 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
tr a, Jim a, 60K a, Toys 
a.X, Jackson a.X, 8OK a.X, Toys 
t] a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
a.X, Jun a.X, 7OK a.X, PCs 
t3' a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t4" a, Ying a, 65K a, Clothes 
tv  X, Jack 1,60K X, Clothes 
Shyam Jim Ying Jack 
Jack 
Jun Jacksoi 
(c) Third step 
Figure 3.1 (Cont.) Three steps of generating a's view from y's view 
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4. Algebra 
In parametric approach, algebra contains three parts: domain expressions, which evaluate to 
parametric elements, relational expressions, which evaluate multilevel security relations and 
boolean expressions, which evaluate a tuple to TRUE or FALSE. 
Remember that the set of parametric elements is C = {y, a, (3, 1, y.a, y.(3, yl, al, (3.X, y.al, 
y.p.X}. For any fixed user, all algebraic computations will be performed according to this user's 
view. The set C contains all the possible valid parametric elements, which is also from the highest 
user's view. By putting restriction of domain, we could easily get concurrences for different users. 
For example, C = {y, a, P, 1, y.a, y.p, yl, al, p.X, y.al, y.p.X} is also the parametric space that 
user y can see; {a, 1, al} is what a can see; (P, 1, p.X} is what P can see; and {1} is what X can 
see. 
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NAME SALARY DNAME 
tl y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.aX, 80K y.aX, Toys 
h y, Hari y,50K y, Toys 
yX, Jun y.l, 70K yX, PCs 
t3 a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
aX, Jun aX, 70K aX, PCs 
u a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t5 y, Lan y, 65K y, Shoes 
y.a, Ying y.a, 65K y.a, Clothes 
te P, Olga P, 50K P,PCs 
t7 P,Jackson P, 60K P, Clothes 
p.X, Jackson P.I, 80K P%, Toys 
(a) Emp relation 
DNAME MANAGER 
ti y, Toys y, Hari 
y.a, Toys y.a, Jim 
y.p, Toys y.p, Jose 
yX, Toys yX, Jackson 
y.pi, Toys y.p.X, Jackson 
y.aX, Toys y.aX, Jackson 
h y, Shoes y, Jack 
y.a, Shoes y.a, Jack 
t3 a, Clothes a, Ying 
aX, Clothes aX, Jack 
u P, Clothes P, Jackson 
p.X, Clothes p.X, Jack 
t5 P,PCs P, Olga 
PI, PCs P.X, Jun 
(b) Dept relation 
Figure 4.1. The tabular representation and skeleton representation of personnelDB 
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Hari Jack Lan 
Jim JYing Jack 
Jos- Olga Jackson 
Jacl Jackson 
Shyam 
Jur 
(c) Emp skeleton 
Toys Shoes 
Shoes Clothes To-
s PCs Clothes 
Clothes Toy 
(d) Dept skeleton 
Figure 4.1 (Cont.) The tabular representation and skeleton representation of personnelDB 
4.1 Domain expressions 
Domain expressions are the syntactic counterpart of security elements. They are formed by 
using parametric elements, [[A]], [[A0B]], [[A0b]], [[E]], n, u, and -, where A and B are 
attributes, bis a constant, and Eisa relational expression. If (j, is a domain expression and x is a 
tuple then (j,(T) is the substitution of i in ji and evaluates to a parametric element. We use symbol 
">!/' to denote restriction in domain. 
Example 7. Consider the domain expression [[SALARY=60K]]. For a given tuple, the expression 
retrieves the path expression(s) where salary is 60K. For ti in Emp relation in Figure 4.1, 
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[[SALARY=60K]](tO evaluates to {y||, y.a, y.(3||, yl, y.p./.. y.a./.||}. Consider the domain 
expression [[SALARY=60K]]n-[[DNAME=Clothes]]. For a given tuple, the expression retrieves 
the path expression(s) where salary is 60K and the department is not Clothes. For ti in Emp 
relation in Figure 4.1, it evaluates to {y||, y.a, y.(3||, y.X||, y.(31||, y.al||}. 
4.2 Boolean expressions 
Boolean expressions evaluate a tuple to boolean values (TURE or FALSE). They are formed by 
using JJXZV, A, v, and —where (j, and v are domain expressions. 
4.3 Relational expressions 
Relational expressions evaluate multilevel security relations. 
4.3.1. Union and difference 
If r and s are relations over the schema R and with the key K, then rus and r-s also have the 
same schema and key [3], 
In case of union, compatible tuples across the two relations (recall that compatible tuples have 
same root) will be collapsed into one tuple. Compatible objects in these two consistent tuples will 
be collapsed together according to definition 3. Other tuples of r and s remain unaltered in rus. In 
case of difference, the computation for compatible tuples will be done according to definition 2 
and definition 3, and other tuples of r remain unchanged in r-s. 
4.3.2. Projection 
In the parametric model, a user thinks in terms of relations with keys [4]. In traditional relational 
databases, if r is a relation over the schema R, and X is a set of attributes, the operator ttx(R) 
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defined by TTX(R)={T[X] :TG R} is a unary operation, and it might lack of the key. For example, 
TtsALARy(Emp) from Figure 4.1 in traditional databases will give us a set of tuples with only 
SALARY field which lacks a key. Thus, the field SALARY itself will become the key. As a result, 
the system will do the restructuring and eliminate the duplicate tuples. In multilevel security 
database, subjects have beliefs about the identities. And we assume that subjects only have beliefs 
about the identities of the objects; such beliefs don't extend to other properties. We have no idea 
how to deal with restructuring without a key. To solve the problem, whenever we do the 
projection, we will always bring the key attribute in the projection result to keep the subjects' 
beliefs. 
If r is a relation over the schema R and with the key K, and X is a set of attributes, 
7Tx(R)={T[K,X]:TG R}. Figure 4.2 shows the result of 7tSALARY(Emp). 
NAME SALARY 
tl y, Jack y, 100K 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K 
yl, Jack yl, 60K 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K 
y.al, Jackson y.al, 80K 
h y, Hari y,50K 
yl, Jun y.l, 70K 
t3 a, Shyam a, 5 OK 
al, Jun al, 7OK 
u a, Jack a, 40K 
t5 y, Lan y, 65K 
y.a, Ying y.a, 65K 
te P, Olga P, 50K 
t7 P,Jackson P, 60K 
p.X, Jackson P.I, 80K 
Figure 4.2 7ISALARY(EIIIP) 
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4.3.3. Selection 
A selection is of the form o(r, f, (j,), where f is a boolean expression and ^ is a domain 
expression. The selection o(r, f, (j.) evaluates to {x restricted to (j, (x): f(i) }. The key of o(r, f, (j.) is 
the same as the key of r. If f evaluates to TRUE for a tuple, o allows a user to select only a 
relevant part of it, which is specified by (j,. Especially in our model, if the whole tuple is not 
relevant, this tuple will be discarded; otherwise, the path expressions for relevant part of this tuple 
are unmasked, and for the irrelevant part of it are all masked. In another word, whenever we select 
a part of a skeleton, we will retrieve all objects in this skeleton except that relevant objects are 
unmasked and irrelevant objects are masked. By keeping the masked objects, we keep the path 
expressions closed under prefixes. 
Example 8. y asks the information about employees who are thought to work in Toys by a. 
a(Emp,, ||NAMExl*.a.* ||n||DNAME=Toys||) 
"Jack1 
Shyam Jim 
Jackson 
(a) Skeleton representation 
Figure 4.3. The query result of Example 8 
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NAME SALARY DNAME 
y , Jack Yll, 100K y||, Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.|3||, Jose Y-PII, 40K y.p||, Toys 
yX||, Jack yX||, 60K yX||, Clothes 
y.p.X||, Jack y.p.l||, 60K y.p.X||, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.al, 80K y.aX, Toys 
a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
aX||, Jun a.X||, 70K a.X||, PCs 
(b) Tabular representation 
Figure 4.3 (Cont.) The query result of Example 8 
Figure 4.3 shows the result of query in Example 8. Objects which are circled are masked 
objects in skeleton representation. When we compute this query, the first thing we need to do is 
get the user's y view since it's y who is asking the question. This validates the maximum data set 
we could work on. Since there is no boolean expression, the second thing is to evaluate the 
domain expression [[NAME^*.a.*]]n[[DNAME=Toys]]. After evaluating the restriction 
||NAMExl*.a.* 11. we actually get three tuples, besides the two tuples in Figure 4.3 (b), we also 
had the following tuple. 
a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
But then we discarded this tuple since Jack doesn't work in Toys department. Finally we make all 
the irrelevant objects masked. 
Example 9. a asks the information about employees who are thought to work in Toys by a. 
a(Emp,, ||NAMExla.* ||n||DNAME=Toys||) 
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a . Shyam Jim 
A : Jun 
(a) Skeleton representation 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
a, Jim a, 60K a, Toys 
a.X, Jackson a.X, 80K a.X, Toys 
a, Shyam a, 5 OK a, Toys 
a.X||, Jun a.X||, 70K a.X||, PCs 
(b) Tabular representation 
Figure 4.4. The query result for Example 9 
The difference of Example 8 and Example 9 comes from the context of user levels. Different 
users have different views which will be generated in the first step in computation time. 
Jackson 
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5. Update mechanism 
In Skeleton-based MLS model, a user can update objects only at its own level. To preserve 
belief consistency, the update for each object has to validate the same object existing in other 
tuples. This action will be taken inside the system, user won't be aware of it. 
In the following we use K as an abbreviation to denote the key of a relation r which might 
actually be multiple keys K1K2. . .Kn and K=k to denote an assignment of ordinary values to keys. 
For any attribute M, M=m denotes assignment to an arbitrary set M of attributes of r. 
5.1 Connect clause and asserting a belief 
Connect clause is used for a user to allow lower object(s) to be connected. The format of 
connect clause is "connect [{u^ (K=k,)| | to {u2: (K=k2)}", where k, is the key values of the 
current user, "ui" is the higher user, "u2" is the lower user and "k2" is the key values of the lower 
object. Notice that only the key values are specified. Values of other attributes are determined 
automatically. 
The part "[{uv (K=ki)}]" in connect clause is optional. When connect clause is included in 
other update operations, such as insert or update, this part can be omitted. 
If execution of a connect clause succeeds, a concurrence will be generated. When executing the 
connect clause, the system will first check whether the concurrence that will be generated from 
connect clause is valid or not. If not, the system will not proceed and return an error. Otherwise, 
the path expressions of related objects will be changed accordingly. 
Example 10. (For y) Suppose y wants to connect Lan in its own level to Jackson in (3 level in Emp 
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relation, the corresponding connect clause and the result are in Figure 5.1: 
connect (y, Lan) to ((3, Jackson) 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
t5 y, Lan y, 65K y, Shoes 
y.a, Ying y.a, 65K y.a, Clothes 
t7 (3, Jackson P, 60K (3, Clothes 
(3.X, Jackson P.I, 80K (31, Toys 
Related tuples before executing connect clause 
tnew y, Lan y, 65K y, Shoes 
y.a, Ying y.a, 65K y.a, Clothes 
y.(3, Jackson y.(3, 60K y.(3, Clothes 
y.(3.X, Jackson y.(3.X, 80K y.p.X, Toys 
After executing connect clause 
Figure 5.1. The query result for Example 10 
After execution of connect clause, tuples t5 and t7 are collapsed into one tuple. The path 
expressions previously in t7 now are starting from y, showing the belief path that starts from y. 
5.2 Disconnect clause and removing a belief 
Disconnect clause is used for a user to allow lower object(s) to be disconnected. The format of 
disconnect clause is "disconnect [{uv (K=k,)| | from {u2: (K=k2)}" which means "disconnect the 
object whose key values are k, at the user level Ui and the object whose key values are k2 at u2 
level". In this clause, the user who wants to perform this action is always Ui which is the higher 
level user. Same as connect clause, the values of attributes other than the key values will be 
determined automatically. 
Disconnect clause happens in one tuple. After executing the disconnect clause, the tuple will be 
broken down into several separate tuples. The path expressions within each tuple will be altered 
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accordingly. 
Same as connect clause, disconnect clause can also be nested into other operations. In that case, 
the part "[{uv (K=ki)}]" can be omitted. 
Example 11. User y wants to disconnect Jack in its own level from Jim in a level in Emp relation, 
the corresponding disconnect clause and the result are in Figure 5.2: 
disconnect (y, Jack) from (a, Jim) 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
ti y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.aX, 80K y.aX, Toys 
Related tuple before executing disconnect clause 
tnewl y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
tnew2 a, Jim a, 60K a, Toys 
aX, Jackson aX, 80K aX, Toys 
Generated tuples after executing disconnect clause 
Figure 5.2. The query result for Example 11 
5.3 Insert 
When a user u inserts an object, the user may also want to connect it to identities at lower levels. 
The first thing system will do is to check if the new object exists at level u. If so, the user will get 
an error from the system; otherwise, the insert transaction will proceed. When it comes to connect, 
the same procedure as mentioned in 5.1 will be proceeded. The format of insert is 
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Insert (X=x) in r 
[connect to {u: (K=k)}] 
Example 12. User y inserts the object "Mike" in the Emp relation and associates the identity to 
"Jackson" at (3 level. The corresponding insert clause and the result are in Figure 5.3: 
insert (NAME=Mike; SALARY=100K; DNAME=Toys) in Emp 
connect to ((3, Jackson) 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
t7 (3, Jackson 
(3.X, Jackson 
P, 60K 
P.I, 80K 
P, Clothes 
P%, Toys 
Before executing the insertion 
t?new y, Mike 
y.(3, Jackson 
y.p.X, Jackson 
y, 100K 
y.p, 60K 
y.p.X, 8OK 
y, Toys 
y.p, Clothes 
y.p.X, Toys 
After executing the insertion 
Figure 5.3. The query result for Example 12 
5.4 Delete 
A user can only delete an object in its own object space. When a user u deletes an object, if this 
object exists in multiple tuples, the identity of the object will be removed from each tuple in the 
relation. The system will also remove the concurrence related to this object. This might break one 
tuple into several tuples. If the generated tuple is a subset of some other tuple, they will be merged 
together. If a tuple becomes empty, it will be removed from the relation. The delete operation is of 
the form 
delete (K=k) from r 
Example 13. User a deletes the object "Jim" from the Emp relation. The corresponding delete 
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clause and the result are in Figure 5.4: 
delete (NAME=Jim) from Emp 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
ti y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.a, Jim y.a, 60K y.a, Toys 
y.[3, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
y.aX, Jackson y.aX, 80K y.aX, Toys 
Before executing the deletion 
ti y, Jack y, 100K y, Toys 
y.p, Jose y.p, 40K y.p, Toys 
yX, Jack yX, 60K yX, Clothes 
y.p.X, Jack y.p.X, 60K y.p.X, Clothes 
After executing the deletion 
Figure 5.4. The query result for Example 13 
Note that after deleting Jim at a level, Jackson at 1 level didn't form a new tuple. This is 
because Jackson at 1 level is a subset of the tuple t7in original Emp relation. It's merged into t7. 
5.5 Update 
A user can only update the object in its own object space. There will be two different situations 
of update operations: update key values and update attribute values which are not key values. We 
only talk about update of attribute values which are not key values in this paper. Update of key 
values will be our future work. The update is of the form 
update (K=k) in r to (X=x) 
[connectto {u: (K'=k')}] 
When update of an object happens, each tuple involving the identity will be updated. Connect 
51 
clause may be nested. If the concurrence that will be generated after the connect clause violates 
the existing concurrence, the system will only do the update of the attribute values and report the 
error of connect operation. In this case, if user wants to change the belief, he has to disconnect the 
concurrence first and connect the object to some other object. 
Example 14. User y wants to change the salary of Lan to 85K and then connect it to Jack. The 
corresponding update clause and the result are in Figure 5.5: 
update (NAME=Lan) in Emp to (SALARY=85K) 
connect to {a: (NAME=Jack)} 
NAME SALARY DNAME 
t4 a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t5 y, Lan 
y.a, Ying 
y, 65K 
y.a, 65K 
y, Shoes 
y.a, Clothes 
Before update 
t4 a, Jack a, 40K a, Shoes 
t5 y, Lan 
y.a, Ying 
Y,85K 
y.a, 65K 
y, Shoes 
y.a, Clothes 
After update 
Figure 5.5. The query result for Example 14 
Note that even after the update, the concurrence from (y, Lan) to (a, Jack) is not formed. This is 
because system found that there is already a concurrence from (y, Lan) to (a, Ying), so building 
another concurrence from (y, Lan) to (a, Jack) is not legal. The system will report this information 
to the user y. If y still wants to change the belief, he should first disconnect the existing 
concurrence and then build a new one. 
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6. Related works 
Now we make some comparisons with [9], In our model we assume that the object spaces at 
different levels are independent. [9] assumes that if a subject believes in existence of an object, all 
upper subjects must also believe in its existence as well. We assume that even when the upper 
subject does concur about existence, the identity of the object can be different at the upper level. 
On the other hand [9] assumes that the identity of an object will be same at all levels. This applies 
to subjects that are parallel as well as strictly higher. What about other attributes? We assume that 
these values are also independent at all levels. [9] gives a way to infer these values from values 
that exist at levels immediately below, sometimes leading to null values. [2] introduced updates 
where a upper user could either manually enter its own values for key, as well as non-key 
attributes. A notion of subscription was also developed, that allow different non-key attribute 
values to be propagated automatically from designated lower user. At present our work in 
multilevel security has not considered nulls. 
Now we briefly discuss the type of nulls incorporated in [9]. Recall that the values of key 
attributes cannot have nulls. Therefore, we only consider a non-key attribute value of some object 
at some level. This value can be derived from values of the same object from levels directly below. 
If all levels directly below agree on a non-null value, this value can be propagated upward. When 
the levels differ, but have non-null values, either the non-null value belonging to one user or a null 
can be propagated. When there is a mix of non-null and null values there is option of giving 
priority to non-null values to propagate; otherwise a null is propagated. When all values at level 
directly below are null, a null is propagated. It is shown that depending upon the choices made, 
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the propagation is most informative and without leading to inconsistencies. 
In addition to propagation of values, [9] also considers SQL-style primary keys and 
foreign-keys. Note that in SQL a foreign key in the referencing relation has to be a primary-key in 
the referenced relation. As expected, primary key attributes cannot have nulls. If a foreign key is 
non-null, it has to exist as a primary-key in the referenced relation. These constraints have been 
formally developed for the classical relations and applied at a fixed level at a time. 
We talked about belief consistency, and paper [7] gave us a belief consistent MLS data model. 
Authors of [7] look at each object as a tuple as long as there is no different belief on this object 
from different users. If there is more than one different belief on a piece of data, the objects (even 
if they are viewed as same identity) will be kept in different tuples. The problem of belief 
consistency easily comes up in their model and a set of rules has to set up to preserve belief 
consistency. Coming along with this, query about different beliefs becomes complicated. In our 
model, since we maintain cascading beliefs in a tuple, we only take care of such situation in the 
points where different skeletons meet in any update operation. Our approach makes query of 
multiple beliefs efficient and largely reduces join. 
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7. Conclusion and future works 
In this paper we provide a parametric approach to build an MSL model. Our Skeleton-based 
MLS model assembles cascading beliefs of an object. Each skeleton is represented as a tuple. By 
using path expressions as parametric elements, we preserve user's cascading view of an object 
into one tuple. This relieves the user the burden of having to assemble cascading of beliefs 
through multiple joins. Based on this, we can design an efficient query language for users to ask 
questions about multiple beliefs. At the same time, join will be largely reduced. As an important 
property of path expressions within a tuple, closure under prefixes helps algebraic identities hold. 
In order to make sure path expressions are always closed under prefixes within a tuple, mask will 
be applied if necessary. The closure under prefixes of path expressions and masking/unmasking 
are managed by the system automatically. 
We provided the algebra union, intersection, difference and projection as well as the update 
mechanism of the model. We are still working on the associative navigation A6B. After this, we 
are able to provide the natural join. When we finish all the algebra, we will provide an SQL-like 
query language and consider the operation of change of key attributes. This finishes the 
skeleton-based model. We will also try to consider about graph-based model, which will model all 
the connected points in one value. Recall that in skeleton-based model, several skeletons might be 
connected. In graph-based model, all these connected skeletons will be modeled in one value. By 
doing so, the problem of belief inconsistency will totally disappear. Further more, this model will 
handle even more complicated queries, such as query about atomic values in one skeleton from 
another skeleton through connected points. 
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